In examining reporting practices before and after this change, Houghton (1994) observed a significant increase in the frequencies of profit and loss (P&L) items classified as 'abnormal items' after 1989, and that they were, on average, losses, whereas they were previously, on average, gains. Classification of P&L items as abnormal attracted the attention of regulators and the media in the late 1990s, with concerns that items which should have been classified as part of profit from normal operations were being classified as 'abnormal' to improve reported 'normal' earnings When the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) proposed to remove the abnormal items classification from accounting standards, some respondents to the exposure draft supported the move, while others argued it inhibited companies' ability to indicate the underlying transitory nature of some items. Revisions to accounting standards nevertheless proceeded and thus, from 2001, Australian companies were no longer permitted to classify P&L items as abnormal.
The controversy surrounding the perceived abuses of classifying P&L items as abnormal, and the opposition to removal of the abnormal classification from accounting standards, raises the question of whether the change was justified. This paper seeks to address this issue by examining whether there was an increase in the frequency and magnitude of abnormal items over the seven-year period up to the removal of the 'abnormal' classification from accounting standards.
In the next section we review how operating profit and profit outside ordinary operations are distinguished. We then examine the changes to accounting standard requirements relating to abnormal items and explore the reasons for those changes. In the final section, we investigate whether there is any empirical evidence to suggest opportunistic classification of operating P&L items as abnormal.
DISTINGUISHING OPERATING PROFIT AND PROFIT OUTSIDE ORDINARY OPERATIONS
Reporting the results of operations is viewed as one of the most important aspects of financial reporting (Williams, 1998) . The manner in which information is disclosed in the financial statements is said to enhance users' ability to make predictions in regard to companies' future prospects. A company's activities may differ in regard to stability, risk and the predicability of financial performance. Hence the separate disclosure of earnings components facilitates understanding of the company's underlying performance in the financial reporting period and assists financial statement users in determining the extent to which past results can be useful in assessing a company's future results. For instance, the income statement's predictive value is enhanced if unusual, abnormal or infrequent items of income and expense are separately disclosed (Rapaccioli & Schiff, 1993) .
Accounting standards require companies to disaggregate net income into specific components. Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) allow management to use discretion in determining how certain items are classified and reported in the financial statements. Classification affects where an item is placed in the financial statements and hence can result in more detailed disclosure of an item by means of its placement. For example, if management wishes to draw attention to a particular transaction, classifying an item as unusual, special, significant, abnormal or extraordinary may achieve this objective. On the other hand, if management wants to 'mask' a transaction (Bernard & Schipper, 1994) , then the classification of such an item in ordinary earnings may achieve this purpose.
U.S. research provides empirical evidence of companies opportunistically classifying P&L items as 'special items' 1 (see for example Elliot & Shaw, 1998; Bartov, 1993; Francis et al, 1996; Moerle, 2002; McVay, 2006) . McVay (2006) finds that companies opportunistically shift expenses from 'core' earnings to special items to boost reported core earnings. As special items are generally viewed as transitory in nature, both managers and analysts tend to exclude them from core earnings. McVay, (2006) finds that, on average, reported special items are in fact current-period operating expenses that are not transitory and therefore were opportunistically classified as 'special'.
Special items are similar to 'abnormal items', which was the term used in Australia, and are similarly viewed as transitory in nature.
THE RISE OF ABNORMAL ITEMS
In Australia, the first accounting standard relating to reporting operating profit was AAS 1: Profit and Loss Statements, 2 items of revenue and expense, and other gains and losses, brought into account in the period, which although attributable to the ordinary operations of the business entity are considered abnormal by reason of their size and effect on the results for the period (para. 4 (c)).
which was initially issued in December 1973.
AAS 1 distinguished between operating profit, abnormal items and extraordinary, defining abnormal items as:
Extraordinary items were defined at that time in AAS 1 as:
items of revenue and expense, and other gains and losses, brought to account in the period, which are attributable to events or transactions outside the ordinary operations of the business entity (para. 4 (d)).
Thus, the distinguishing feature between extraordinary items and abnormal items was whether they arose from the ordinary operations of the business; extraordinary items originate outside ordinary operations, whereas abnormal items emanate from ordinary operations, but, because of their size and effect on income, warrant separate disclosure.
When AAS 1 was first issued, abnormal items were considered by some to be "merely highlighted components of operating profit" (Jukes, 1988: 85) . Abnormal items were perceived as being used to manage users' perceptions of operating performance by bringing the reader's attention to the "existence of large debits or credits included in profit for the year which were from operations" (Jukes, 1988: 85) .
The extraordinary item classification was generally viewed as being too subjective (Jukes, 1988) 4 Subsequent to the 1989 change to the definition of extraordinary items, many companies began to highlight profit before abnormal items when releasing results.
The standard gave companies the option of disclosing abnormal items on the face of the income statement or in the notes to the financial statements. Abnormal items and 'operating profit before abnormal items' were typically presented as separate line items on the income statement. Company press releases announcing profit results also commonly focussed on profit before abnormal items, rather than net operating profit.
The change meant that for an item to be reported as extraordinary it must be both outside the ordinary operations of the business and nonrecurring. This more stringent definition of extraordinary items meant that many items that were previously reported as extraordinary would no longer qualify for that classification and would have to be included as abnormal items (or otherwise) as part of the all-important operating profit number (Parry, 1990) .
For many financial statement users, particularly journalists and financial analysts, earnings before abnormal items became a key measure of performance, at the expense of performance indicators disclosed in the profit and loss statement (Parker & Porter, 2000) .
Houghton (1994) conducted a study of the changes in reporting of extraordinary and abnormal items by 91 of Australia's largest companies during the years 1988 to 1991, representing two years prior to, and two years after the changes to the accounting standard. Houghton (1994) found that, on average, extraordinary items reported in 1988 and 1989 were losses, while during the same period, abnormal items were, on average, gains. However, after the definitional change to extraordinary items, the number of reported extraordinary items declined by approximately half. In contrast, the number of reported abnormal items doubled after 1989. Houghton's (1994) evidence suggests that the change in definition made extraordinary items a rarer event and concurrently the reporting of abnormal items became more frequent.
Interestingly, the nature of reported abnormal items also fundamentally changed after the change to the definition of extraordinary items. Prior to the change, abnormal items were, on average, consistently gains, whereas after the change abnormal items were, like extraordinary items, on average large losses. Houghton's (1994) analysis suggests that with the tightening of the definition of extraordinary items and the consequent limited opportunities to shift expenses away from operating profit, companies started to use the abnormal classification to shift expenses from operating profit.
5

THE DEMISE OF ABNORMAL ITEMS
In the late 1990s, the reporting of abnormal items drew much criticism, particularly the perception that "there is no such thing as abnormal profits, only abnormal losses" (Parker & Porter, 2000: 66) , and that companies were using abnormal items to improve their reported earnings before abnormal items (McLean, 1999; Saunders, 1999) . Abnormal items reporting practices also came under the scrutiny of regulators.
In its 1999 financial reporting surveillance program, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) expressed concern that companies were classifying items as abnormal to report an improved earnings before abnormal items result (McCahey, 1999) . Specific concerns identified by ASIC were: (1) many companies provided insufficient information for financial statement users to be able to determine the nature of items reported as abnormal; (2) expenses were classified as abnormal even though they were part of the normal operating activities of a company and that they were of a similar size from year to year; and (3) mining exploration companies were disclosing all write-offs of exploration expenditure as abnormal (McCahey, 1999: 72) . These criticisms suggest that companies were opportunistically classifying items as 'abnormal' to influence users' perceptions about their earnings. When a revenue or an expense from ordinary activities is of such a size, nature or incidence that its disclosure is relevant in explaining the financial performance of the entity for the reporting period and its disclosure is not otherwise required by this or another Standard, its nature and amount must be disclosed separately either on the face of the statement of financial performance or in the notes in the financial report (para. 5.4).
Accordingly, under the revised AASB 1018, reporting results before and after abnormal items was no longer permitted. However, the continued practice of disclosing material items of revenue and expense as 'abnormal', significant' or 'unusual' raises the issue of whether the standard setters were justified in removing the 'abnormal' classification from the accounting standard.
In the next section, we examine companies' reporting practices before the change to AASB 1018 (effective 2001) to identify whether there is evidence of changes in the frequency and magnitude of abnormal item disclosures that may suggest companies were opportunistically classifying items as abnormal.
CHANGES IN THE FREQUENCY AND MAGNITUDE OF P&L ITEMS CLASSIFIED AS 'ABNORMAL'
This study explores whether the shift in nature and the increase in the reporting of abnormal items in the early 1990s, as documented by Houghton (1994), continued until the term 'abnormal items' was removed from accounting standards (effective from 2001). We examine the trends over time to identify whether the frequency of reported abnormal items increased, whether the magnitude of reported abnormal items changed, and whether there is symmetry in reporting of abnormal gains and losses.
The study period commences in 1994 and extends to the last year in which abnormal items were required to be reported by AASB 1018 (2000). The year 1994 was selected as the starting point due to limitations on data availability prior to that year.
The sample is drawn from the top 500 companies by market capitalisation, as reported in Shareholder (1999). After eliminating companies that are foreign domiciled or unit trusts, and firm-years with incomplete data, the final sample comprises a total of 411 unique companies, representing a total of 2112 firm-years over the seven-year period from 1994 to 2000. Financial data were extracted from the ASX FinData database and company financial reports on the Connect 4 database.
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Did the frequency of reported abnormal items increase? Houghton (1994) found that in the two years immediately after the changed definition of extraordinary items in 1989, the number of abnormal items reported by the top 100
Australian companies doubled. He also observed that concurrently with the decline in frequencies of reported extraordinary items, the frequencies of the top 100 companies reporting abnormal items increased. We examine whether there is evidence of an increase in frequencies of reported abnormal items by the top 500 companies over an extended period after the 1989 change to the accounting standard. Table 1 
[TABLE 1 HERE]
To further explore whether this relatively steady pattern holds in relation to abnormal income and expenses, we split the sample between companies reporting abnormal losses and those reporting abnormal gains. 11 The frequencies shown in Table 2 indicate that while the overall percentage of companies reporting abnormal items remained relatively constant over the seven-year period, the proportion of companies reporting abnormal losses is clearly higher than those reporting abnormal gains in each year of the study period. Table 2 shows that over the seven-year sample period, almost two-thirds of the observations were abnormal losses. However, in 1994, only 56% of reported abnormal items were losses and this percentage increased to peak at 71% in 1998, then declined to 67% in 1999 and 62% in 2000. The increased incidence of abnormal losses suggests that companies may have been increasingly classifying large expense items as abnormal to shift them out of 'normal' earnings. The decline in both the frequency of abnormal items and proportion of abnormal losses after 1998 may be attributable to the increased attention of regulators and the media in relation to perceived abuses of classifying items as 'abnormal.' Companies may have also responded to the impending removal of the 'abnormal' classification from the accounting standard, as signalled by ED 93 (issued in July 1998).
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Did the magnitude of reported abnormal items change?
To explore whether there was a change in the magnitude of reported abnormal items, descriptive statistics for the value of abnormal items reported each year are presented in Table 3 , Panel A, showing that in all years, abnormal items were, on average, a loss. The median value of abnormal items remained relatively constant between 1994
and 1996, more than doubled in 1997, almost doubled again in 1998, before declining in 1999 and then sharply increasing again in 2000.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
To further explore these changes in the magnitude of abnormal items, the sample companies are split between those reporting abnormal losses and those reporting abnormal gains. The median values for each are presented in Panels B and C of Table   3 showing that over the seven-year period, the median values of abnormal gains changed only by relatively small amounts, and in each year were either slightly above or slightly below $2 million. In contrast, abnormal losses ( While these results suggest that the magnitude of abnormal losses reported by the sample companies increased significantly over the study period, they may merely be in line with concurrent magnitudes of company profits. Further analysis is conducted to examine the materiality of abnormal items relative to profit before abnormal items. Table 4 , Panel A, shows that there is an even more marked increase in the median magnitude of reported abnormal items relative to earnings before abnormal items, with the median value of abnormal items just a relatively small negative 2.2% of profit in 1994, rising to a peak of negative 18% in 1998, and declining slightly to a negative 14.7% in 2000.
The pattern of median abnormal gains over the seven-year period (Panel B of Table 4) shows fluctuations between a low of 11.9% and a high of 33.5%. In contrast, the pattern for abnormal losses (Panel C of Table 4) shows the median proportion of abnormal losses relative to earnings before abnormal items was steady at around 20%
for the first three years, jumped to about 36% in 1997 and 1998 and increased to 46.2% in 1999 and 54.5% in 2000. Interestingly, while the proportions of abnormal losses were at their highest in 1999 and 2000, the proportions of abnormal gains for those years were around their lowest. These results confirm that over the last two years before the changes to the accounting standard an increasingly larger proportion of companies were reporting increasingly larger amounts of abnormal losses, whereas fewer companies were reporting relatively smaller amounts of abnormal gains.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
Taken together, our analysis reveals that both the proportional frequency of reported 
CONCLUSION
In this study we find that over the period 1994 to 2000, the median values of reported abnormal items were losses. While the overall frequency of abnormal items did not change markedly, the median dollar (loss) amount of abnormal items increased significantly after 1996. Moreover, our analysis reveals that both the frequency and relative magnitude of reported abnormal losses increased significantly during this period, whereas the frequencies of items reported as abnormal gains remained relatively constant and the relative magnitude fluctuated over this period. The relative magnitude of abnormal losses were a little higher that abnormal gains in 1997 and 1998, but then a dramatic change occurred in 1999 with the relative magnitude of abnormal losses increasing to over three times the amount of abnormal gains, and then further increasing to over four times in 2000 (Table 4 , Panels B and C). Thus, our analysis reveals asymmetry in both the frequencies and amounts of abnormal items reported in the four years leading up to the removal of the abnormal classification from the accounting standard.
Our findings suggest that companies may have opportunistically classified loss items as 'abnormal' and consequently, on average, reported improved 'normal' earnings. On face value, it appears the standard setters were justified in removing the 'abnormal'
classification from the accounting standard. However, if companies were classifying items as abnormal to signal the transitory nature of these items to financial report users, then the change diminishes their ability to communicate information about the nature of reported gains and losses. A relatively large proportion of Cameron and Gallery's (1998) sample of companies (37%) voluntarily disclosed earnings per share before abnormal items, 12 suggesting Australia's largest companies considered that reporting earnings before abnormal items was relevant to users. If the 'abnormal' 
